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Criminal Law
by John A. Regan *
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews opinions impacting the practice of criminal law
delivered by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Georgia
Supreme Court covering the period of June 1, 2019, up until May 21,
2020. 1 This Article is designed to be a mere overview to both prosecutors
and defense attorneys of decisions and new statutes, and it serves as a
broad guideline to how these decisions will affect their practices.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Three Supreme Court decisions are covered in this Article. The first,
Kahler v. Kansas, 2 deals with the insanity defense, whereas Kansas v.
Glover 3 and Mitchell v. Wisconsin 4 deal with traffic stops and blood draws
of drivers who are not responsive, respectively.
The issue in Kahler was a Kansas statute that would not wholly
exonerate a defendant on the ground that his illness prevented him from
recognizing his criminal act as morally wrong. 5 That is to say that
Kansas does not recognize the second prong of the so-called “M’Naghten
Rule,” 6 the landmark nineteenth century English case from which many
states have adapted their insanity defenses. Kansas had adopted the first
prong of M’Naghten, but did not recognize the second. 7 The appellant in

* State Gang Resource Prosecutor, Prosecuting Attorneys Council of Georgia, 2019–
Present, Assistant District Attorney, Macon Judicial Circuit 2001–2019. Wake Forest
University (B.A., cum laude, 1998); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2001). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of criminal law during the prior survey period, see John Allen Regan,
Criminal Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 69 (2019).
2 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020).
3 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020).
4 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
5 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1024.
6 Daniel M’Naghten Opinion (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, reprinted in 8 ENG. REP. 718.
7 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1026.
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Kahler had been convicted of a brutal murder of his estranged wife, his
two daughters, and his wife’s grandmother on Thanksgiving Day. He was
sentenced to death by a jury, but at trial argued Kansas’ insanity law
denied him the defense of showing a defendant did not know the
difference between right and wrong, leaving him only the defense of
showing he did not intend to kill. 8 The Kansas Supreme Court also
denied his appeal based on Kansas law so he appealed to the United
States Supreme Court using a Fourteenth Amendment 9 due process
argument. 10
The Supreme Court opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, was a 6-3
decision against the Appellant wherein the court held that it is up to the
individual states and not the Court to determine when a criminal
defendant can be held liable for his actions, unless there is a violation of
the fundamental principles of justice. 11 As Justice Kagan wrote in her
opinion:
Kansas has an insanity defense negating criminal liability—even
though not the type Kahler demands. As noted earlier, Kansas law
provides that it is “a defense to a prosecution” that “the defendant, as
a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state
required” for a crime. [. . . .] That provision enables a defendant to
present psychiatric and other evidence of mental illness to defend
himself against a criminal charge. More specifically, the defendant can
use that evidence to show that his illness left him without the cognitive
capacity to form the requisite intent.
....
Second, and significantly, Kansas permits a defendant to offer
whatever mental health evidence he deems relevant at sentencing.
[. . . .] A mentally ill defendant may argue there that he is not
blameworthy because he could not tell the difference between right
and wrong. Or, because he did not know his conduct broke the law. Or,
because he could not control his behavior. Or, because of anything else.
In other words, any manifestation of mental illness that Kansas’s
guilt-phase insanity defense disregards—including the moral
incapacity Kahler highlights—can come in later to mitigate culpability
and lessen punishment. And that same kind of evidence can persuade
a judge to replace any prison term with commitment to a mental
health facility . . . . In sum, Kansas does not bar, but only channels to
sentencing, the mental health evidence that falls outside its intent-

Id. at 1027.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1023.
11 Id. at 1024.
8
9
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based insanity defense. When combined with Kansas’s allowance of
mental health evidence to show a defendant’s inability to form
criminal intent, that sentencing regime defeats Kahler’s charge that
the State has “abolish[ed] the insanity defense entirely.” 12

Although Georgia law foundation is in M’Naghten, and Georgia does
allow for a guilty but mentally ill verdict, the decision in Kahler is worth
noting to see if the Georgia General Assembly so chooses to modify
existing statutes to adopt this more streamlined approach to the insanity
defense in criminal cases.
Another critical decision is Kansas v. Glover 13 in which the Court
addressed the “investigative traffic stop” issue by determining whether
evidence from a traffic stop initiated by a deputy running a license plate
and finding the registered owner’s license to have been suspended should
be suppressed. 14 The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized in the stop because the stop was unreasonable. The trial court
granted the motion, but the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed that
decision; however, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and the case ended up on the Supreme Court Docket. 15
In reversing the Kansas Supreme Court decision, Justice Thomas,
writing for an 8-1 majority, denied that the deputy had committed a
Fourth Amendment violation:
Before initiating the stop, Deputy Mehrer observed an individual
operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate
295ATJ. He also knew that the registered owner of the truck had a
revoked license and that the model of the truck matched the observed
vehicle. From these three facts, Deputy Mehrer drew the
commonsense inference that Glover was likely the driver of the
vehicle, which provided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the
stop. The fact that the registered owner of a vehicle is not always the
driver of the vehicle does not negate the reasonableness of Deputy
Mehrer’s inference. Such is the case with all reasonable inferences. 16

However, the Court did hold this case to be narrow in scope, and that,
as with most cases of reasonable suspicion, the ruling was quite fact
specific. 17 As Justice Thomas points out further in his opinion:

Id. at 1030–31.
Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020).
14 Id. at 1187.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1188.
17 Id. at 1191.
12
13
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For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the
vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her midtwenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not “raise a
suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in
wrongdoing.” 18

With the growing use of tag readers in Georgia, this case will be used
as a guideline for law enforcement agencies across the State, as well as
prosecutors and defense counsel, to make sure and focus not just on the
initial reading that comes back from a machine, but to look at the total
picture of the stop before proceeding with an investigation or prosecution.
The question of when police may execute a warrantless blood draw on
an unconscious person suspected of drunk driving was decided in
Mitchell v. Wisconsin. 19 The petitioner in Mitchell had been arrested for
drunk driving and, while at the police station, passed out before the
second required test could be performed. He was then transported to the
hospital where a warrantless blood draw was performed. The results of
the blood draw showed his blood alcohol concentration to be almost three
times the legal limit. Petitioner appealed following his denial of his
motion to suppress by both the trial court and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. 20
The Supreme Court, in an unusual 5-4 split, affirmed the warrantless
blood draw. 21 Justice Alito’s opinion allowed the blood draw under
exigent circumstances, noting that:
The importance of the needs served by BAC testing is hard to
overstate. The bottom line is that BAC tests are needed for enforcing
laws that save lives. The specifics, in short, are these: Highway safety
is critical; it is served by laws that criminalize driving with a certain
BAC level; and enforcing these legal BAC limits requires efficient
testing to obtain BAC evidence, which naturally dissipates. So BAC
tests are crucial links in a chain on which vital interests hang. And
when a breath test is unavailable to advance those aims, a blood test
becomes essential. 22

Justice Alito also noted that proper blood alcohol concentration testing is
needed as soon as possible noting: “Enforcement of BAC limits also
requires prompt testing because it is ‘a biological certainty’ that ‘[a]lcohol

18Id.

139 S. Ct. at 2530–31.
Id. at 2528–29.
21 Id. at 2530.
22 Id. at 2535.
19
20
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dissipates from the bloodstream at a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent
per hour . . . . Evidence is literally disappearing by the minute.’” 23
However, Justice Alito’s decision did not create a bright-line rule to
authorize warrantless blood draws in all situations, as he closed his
opinion with the following caveat:
We do not rule out the possibility that in an unusual case a defendant
would be able to show that his blood would not have been drawn if
police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police could not
have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere
with other pressing needs or duties. Because Mitchell did not have a
chance to attempt to make that showing, a remand for that purpose is
necessary. 24

Although the decision was 5-4, it is interesting to note the break-down
of the Justices in the opinions. The normally liberal-leaning Justice
Breyer joined Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, Justice Roberts, and Justice
Kavanaugh, while Justice Gorsuch, normally seen as a conservative,
joined the minority made up of Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and
Justice Kagan.
III. GEORGIA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Casting off over one hundred precedents of both the court itself and
the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court established
the so-called “Cumulative Error Rule” in State v. Lane. 25 The case stems
from a defendant who was convicted in a murder-for-hire gone wrong. 26
“The trial court found that trial counsel was ineffective for, among other
reasons, (1) failing to cross-examine [the lead detective] with evidence
that he testified falsely about [a witness’s] statements to him, and
(2) failing to object to hearsay and bolstering testimony by [the lead
detective.]” 27 “In addition, the trial court found that it had erred in
various respects, including in admitting . . . .” hearsay evidence. 28 In
establishing the new precedent, Justice Peterson argued:
It would make no sense to say that one trial court error in admitting
certain evidence was harmless given the strength of other evidence
that was improperly admitted, then say that the error in admitting the
second piece of evidence was harmless given the strength of the first

Id. at 2536.
Id. at 2539.
25 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).
26 Id., 838 S.E.2d at 810–11.
27 Id. at 13, 838 S.E.2d at 812.
28 Id.
23
24
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improper evidence. Indeed, weighing prejudice cumulatively is simply
a natural implication of the harmless error doctrine: The cumulative
effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to
prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.
The purpose of a cumulative-error analysis is to address that
possibility. Such an analysis is an extension of the harmless-error rule,
which is used to determine whether an individual error requires
reversal. 29

However, in adopting this new rule, the court did note that the
cumulative errors in this case were of an evidentiary nature and the court
was not focusing on other types of error that may or may not occur at
trial. 30 The ruling puts a defendant on notice that an appeal under this
new standard not based on an evidentiary standard must show why the
new rule should be enlarged to encompass the new allegation. 31
The court addressed the issue of a defendant’s right to an “out-oftime” appeal in Collier v. State. 32 The case arises from a defendant who
entered a guilty plea in 2009 to a 2008 murder case in Macon County. In
2018, the defendant filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal based on the
argument that his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right to appeal
and, immediately after he was sentenced, he informed his counsel that
he wished to withdraw his plea and file an appeal for his conviction. The
trial court summarily denied his motion. 33
As in Lane, mentioned above, the Supreme Court again overturned years
of precedent cases and held a defendant is no longer required to show
both elements of the Strickland v. Washington 34 standard, namely the
prejudice standard of the second-prong of the test to receive an out-oftime appeal, citing to two Supreme Court decisions 35, namely Roe v.
Flores-Ortega 36 and Garza v. Idaho. 37 In writing for the court, Justice
Ellington stated:
Unfortunately, we have long erroneously held that a defendant
seeking an out-of-time appeal directly from a judgment entered on a
guilty plea must satisfy the prejudice component of the Strickland
standard by showing that his appeal would have had merit. See
Ringold, 304 Ga. at 881 n.3. We have also held that, if the defendant
Id. at 15, 838 S.E.2d at 813–14.
Id. at 17, 838 S.E.2d at 815.
31 Id. at 17–18, 838 S.E.2d at 815.
32 307 Ga. 363, 834 S.E.2d 769 (2019).
33 Id., 834 S.E.2d at 772.
34 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
35 Collier, 307 Ga. at 366, 834 S.E.2d at 774.
36 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
37 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019).
29
30
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cannot show that his appeal would have had merit, the trial court may
forgo an inquiry into whether counsel's performance with respect to
the appeal was constitutionally deficient. For example, in Stephens v.
State, this Court held that,
“in deciding a motion for out-of-time appeal, the trial court must
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defense
counsel's unprofessional conduct was the cause of the
untimeliness only where the motion raises an issue that would
have been meritorious on the existing record had a timely appeal
been taken.”
Because the holding in Stephens conflicts with controlling
United States Supreme Court precedent, it and other opinions with
similar holdings from this Court and the Court of Appeals are
overruled. 38

Although the court’s decision did open up the door for more
defendants to file out-of-time appeals, the court did require the State to
present the argument that a defendant’s delay in filing has unduly
prejudiced the State’s ability to respond as a result of the delay 39 and
further called on the Georgia Assembly as the proper avenue to remedy
and streamline the appeals process, specifically the relationship between
the right to file a Habeas petition and the out-of-time appeals process. 40
The court addressed a defendant’s right to an affirmative defense in
McClure v. State 41 and Pennington v. State. 42 In McClure, a defendant
was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault in Spalding County for
pointing a BB rifle at two people. Defendant asked for the defense of self
and defense of habitation jury charges, but neither were given because
when the defendant testified at trial he refused to admit he had in fact
pointed the rifle even though he admitted he did carry the weapon. 43 The
court of appeals affirmed his conviction and he appealed it to the supreme
court. 44 The supreme court reversed the trial court and the court of
appeals with Justice Ellington writing:
[I]n order to raise an affirmative defense, a criminal defendant need
not “admit” anything, in the sense of acknowledging that any facts
alleged in the indictment or accusation are true. Rather, in asserting
an affirmative defense, a defendant may accept certain facts as true
Collier, 307 Ga. at 366–67, 834 S.E.2d at 774.
Id. at 376, 834 S.E.2d at 781.
40 Id. at 380–82, 834 S.E.2d at 784 (Peterson, J. concurring).
41 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).
42 306 Ga. 854, 834 S.E.2d 63 (2019).
43 McClure, 306 Ga. at 856–57, 834 S.E.2d at 98.
44 Id.
38
39
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for the sake of argument, and the defendant may do so for the limited
purpose of raising the specific affirmative defense at issue. A
defendant is entitled to a requested jury instruction regarding an
affirmative defense when at least slight evidence supports the theory
of the charge, whether in the State's evidence or evidence presented by
the defendant, and regardless of whether the theory of the affirmative
defense conflicts with any other theory being advanced by the
defendant. It follows that a trial court errs in denying a defendant's
request for a jury instruction on an affirmative defense solely on the
basis that the defendant did not admit for all purposes the truth of the
allegations in the indictment or accusation regarding the allegedly
unlawful act. 45

The Court also addressed the pattern jury charge for affirmative
defense given across the state and held it to be good law, but warned that
in light of this decision the phrase “admits the doing of the act charged”
would needed to be changed. 46
Unlike in McClure where the defendant did testify, the defendants in
Pennington did not testify and were convicted of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school.
Both defendants requested the trial court give the affirmative defense
that the actions occurred completely within a private residence, that no
children under seventeen were present at the time, and the act was done
not for financial gain. 47 Their request was denied. 48 As in McClure¸ the
court of appeals affirmed and defendants appealed to the supreme
court. 49 Based on their holding in McClure, the supreme court vacated
the judgment and sent the case back to the court of appeals because
neither the defense nor the State presented evidence at trial that the
active meth lab discovered at Pennington’s residence was not being used
for financial gain. 50
Georgia’s Rape Shield Law 51 was the focus of State v. Burns. 52 At
issue was the defendant who was on trial for aggravated sexual battery,
aggravated sodomy, and incest, which was the result of a social media
post written by his step-daughter detailing their encounter. The post also
contained a reference to an attempted rape by the victim’s brother’s best
friend, an allegation later proven to be false. 53 The trial court granted the
Id. at 863–64, 834 S.E.2d at 102–03.
Id. at 865, 834 S.E.2d at 104.
47 Pennington v. State, 306 Ga. at 854, 834 S.E.2d at 63–64.
48 Id., 834 S.E.2d at 64.
49 Id. at 855, 834 S.E.2d at 64.
50 Id. at 856, 834 S.E.2d at 64–65.
51 O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412 (2019).
52 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367 (2019).
53 Id. at 117–18, 829 S.E.2d at 370.
45
46
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State’s motion to exclude concluding “that the probative value of the
statement in question is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and confusion of the issues and is inadmissible.” 54 The trial
court granted the defendant’s motion for immediate review to the court
of appeals who decided the trial court’s Rule 403 analysis was wrong as
defined under Smith v. State 55 and reversed the lower court. 56
The supreme court first examined if Georgia’s Rape Shield Law,
originally codified in 1976 prior to the adoption of Georgia’s new rules of
evidence in 2013, was in fact still good law. 57 The court did under a plain
language analysis. 58 However, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals analysis applying Smith, ruling the opinion seemingly relied on
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to create a per se rule of
admissibility for evidence of prior false allegations where falsity has been
established, notwithstanding other rules of evidence. 59 These
constitutional provisions demand no such rule, thereby overruling Smith
and nine other cases relying on Smith and forty-six cases that cite and
rely on the constitutional holding. 60 Despite overruling Smith, the court
found the court of appeals was correct in overruling the trial court,
holding that the lower court had misapplied and incorrectly determined
the evidence of the false allegation was inadmissible under 403. 61
Composition of a Grand Jury and actions by the County Clerk of
Court were addressed in State v. Towns. 62 The defendant in this case was
charged with two counts of murder and armed robbery in the murder of
a couple who went to Telfair County to purchase a 1966 Ford Mustang
advertised on Craigslist in 2015. When the State went to indict the
defendant in March of 2016, less than sixteen of the fifty summoned
jurors for Grand Jury appeared, either due to deferrals or failure to
respond. The Chief Judge of the Circuit ordered the Sheriff to locate those
perspective jurors who failed to appear without being dismissed and
Id. at 118, 829 S.E.2d at 370 (citing O.C.G.A § 24-4-403) (internal quotations omitted).
259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989). The court held that once certain procedural
requirements are satisfied, a defendant in a sexual offense prosecution may adduce
evidence at trial that the complaining witness has made prior false accusations of sexual
misconduct and, further, that such evidence is admissible both to attack the credibility of
the victim and as substantive evidence tending to prove that the conduct underlying the
charges did not occur.
56 Burns, 306 Ga. at 117, 829 S.E.2d at 370.
57 Id. at 121, 829 S.E.2d at 372.
58 Id.
59 Id.
54
55

Id.
Id. at 123–24, 829 S.E.2d at 373–74.
62 307 Ga. 351, 834 S.E.2d 839 (2019).
60
61
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bring them to court. The court also ordered the Clerk of the Court to
supplement the Grand Jurors with perspective jurors from the following
day’s jury list. The Clerk complied with the court’s demand, locating two
potential jurors who she knew were available from personal knowledge
and would be available that day. These two jurors selected by the clerk
along with the ones located by the Sheriff composed the Grand Jury and
indicted defendant on murder and armed robbery charges. 63 The
defendant challenged the composition of the Grand Jury, arguing the
actions of the Clerk were not selected at random 64 as required under
Georgia law. 65 The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed
the indictment. 66
The State appealed to the supreme court who agreed with the trial
court. 67 In a 7-2 opinion, Justice Blackwell wrote:
In this case, it is true that the persons summoned for service as petit
jurors were selected at random from the master jury list. But [(1)] in
selecting [the two potential jurors] from that random list to serve on
the grand jury, the clerk relied on her personal knowledge of the
prospective petit jurors, her own assessment of the extent to which she
had the information necessary to contact them, and her estimate of the
likelihood that they would be available to report immediately. Those
selections were not “random” in any sense of the word. The trial court
was right to conclude that [the two potential jurors] were not “cho[sen]
at random” for service on the grand jury and were not, therefore,
selected as required by O.C.G.A. § 15-12-66.1. 68

In his dissent, Justice Ellington goes on to say that although the
actions of the Clerk were not in any way deemed to be done with any
malice, the only result available was dismissal due to a violation of the
statute:
A grand jury is randomly selected only to the extent that all of its
members were randomly selected. Even an occasional, limited, and
well-intentioned violation of the randomness requirement in the
statute governing the summoning of additional grand jurors undercuts
Id. at 352, 834 S.E.2d at 840–41.
Id.
65 O.C.G.A. § 15-12-66.1 requires that the petit jurors selected to serve on the grand jury
be chosen randomly: “When from challenge or from any other cause there are not a
sufficient number of persons in attendance to complete the empaneling of grand jurors, the
presiding judge shall order the clerk to choose at random from the names of persons
summoned as trial jurors a sufficient number of prospective grand jurors necessary to
complete the grand jury.”
66 Towns, 307 Ga. at 351, 834 S.E.2d at 840.
67 Id. at 353, 834 S.E.2d at 841.
68 Id. at 354, 834 S.E.2d at 842.
63
64
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a key feature of the modern scheme for selecting juries. Especially in
light of our prior decisions on this subject, we cannot say that such a
violation is anything less than the violation of an “essential and
substantial” provision of the jury selection statutes. Accordingly, on
the facts before us, the trial court did not err when it dismissed the
indictment as a remedy for the violation of the randomness
requirement that occurred in this case. 69

The supreme court addressed the issue of juror removal during
deliberations in Mills v. State. 70 The defendant in this case was convicted
of felony murder and aggravated assault, and had been sentenced to life
without parole plus twenty years, although the court did not address the
merger issue. 71 The question of the juror removal occurred when, after
approximately four hours of deliberations, the jury sent out a note saying,
“[w]e have a juror that believes the defendants are not guilty, based on
the evidence presented.” 72 The trial court sent the jury home for the day
and told them to report the next day. 73
Approximately two hours after deliberations resumed, the jurors sent
out a second note stating:
Your Honor[,] we have a juror that does not believe any of the witness
testimony, does not believe any of the evidence that was submitted by
the D.A. for this case, and says that there is no proof that Roger or
Moses were in the house on Dec. 23, 2017. And the only thing that
would change their mind, would be to see a clear resolution video from
within the house showing both Roger and Moses firing the guns. Is this
a hung jury? 74

The trial judge then brought the jury in and identified the foreperson
and asked if in fact the note was accurate. The foreperson and other
jurors confirmed the note, and the trial judge then asked for the
identification of the juror in question. 75 The juror, identified as Juror 23,
raised her hand at which time the judge stated the following:
I'm going to exercise the authority that I have under O.C.G.A
[§] 15-12-172 to remove you from further decision-making in this case.
I'm going to make a finding that based upon your position, you are not
69 Id. at 357–58, 834 S.E.2d at 844. As a note, after being dismissed by the Supreme
Court, the defendant was reindicted by a new Grand Jury in Telfair County in January of
2020.
70 308 Ga. 558, 842 S.E.2d 284 (2020).
71 Id. at 558, 842 S.E.2d at 286 n.1.
72 Id. at 560, 842 S.E.2d at 287.
73 Id. at 561, 842 S.E.2d at 287.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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able to perform your duty, that you are not following instructions of
the Court. There's no burden of proof in a criminal case about having
a clear resolution video. So I'm going to remove you from the case and
replace you with the alternate juror. 76

The court removed the juror despite the defendant’s objections. Juror
23 was replaced with an alternate and the court the told the jury to
restart the deliberations from the beginning with the alternate, after
which the defendant was found guilty of felony murder and aggravated
assault. 77
The supreme court reversed the conviction, stating that although the
decision to remove a juror rests with the trial court’s discretion, even
after deliberations have begun, in order to remove a juror:
[t]here must be some sound basis upon which the trial judge exercises
his discretion to remove the juror. A sound basis may be one which
serves the legally relevant purpose of preserving public respect for the
integrity of the judicial process. Where the basis for the juror's
incapacity is not certain or obvious, some hearing or inquiry into the
situation is appropriate to the proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Dismissal of a juror without any factual support or for a legally
irrelevant reason is prejudicial. 78

The supreme court held the trial court had abused its discretion,
finding nothing in the notes sent by the jury before the removal of Juror
23 nor in the trial court’s finding had satisfied the O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 79
standard of removal. 80 Justice Ellington writing for a unanimous Court
ruled:
The trial court's very limited inquiry into Juror 23's possible incapacity
fell short of providing a sound basis for her excusal. That Juror 23 had
reached a conclusion different from that of the other jurors did not
show that she was incapacitated or legally unfit to serve. See Wallace
v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 38 (2) (810 SE2d 93) (2018) (“[A]lternate jurors
generally should not serve to substitute for minority jurors who cannot
agree with the majority, as taking such a minority position does not by
itself render a juror incapacitated or legally unfit to serve, and making
such a substitution may constitute an abuse of discretion.”). We
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in removing Juror
23. Because such an error was harmful, Mills's convictions must be
reversed. See Arnold, 280 Ga. at 489 (“Dismissal of a juror without any
Id., 842 S.E.2d at 287–88.
Id., 842 S.E.2d at 288.
78 Id. at 560, 842 S.E.2d at 287.
79 O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 (2019).
80 Mills, 308 Ga. at 562, 842 S.E.2d at 288.
76
77
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factual support or for a legally irrelevant reason is prejudicial.”
(citation omitted)). 81

The final case reviewed in this note deals with extraordinary motions
for new trial and DNA evidence. In State v. Gates, 82 the court dealt with
the appeal of a conviction for murder and rape that occurred in 1977 in
Columbus, Georgia, where the victim was found shot to death, bound
with neckties and a belt from a bathroom robe. 83 The defendant, nineteen
years old at the time of the crime, was identified out of a line-up two
months later, was read his Miranda 84 rights, wrote a confession, and
agreed to go with police back to the crime scene. 85 Once the defendant
left the crime scene, police dusted for prints and found two prints that
matched the defendant, even though no prints had been found at the
initial search of the crime scene. 86 Defendant did not testify at trial and
was convicted and sentenced to death. 87
Defendant unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and also was
unsuccessful in his state or federal habeas petitions, during the latter of
which he attempted to expand the record to include a GBI report from
1976 mentioning the neckties and bathroom robe; however, the record
was not clear on whether the defendant had attempted to obtain these
items as part of his federal habeas petition. Defendant then filed a second
state habeas in 1989 seeking a psychological evaluation, alleging he was
ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability. In 1992, the
defendant was ordered to have a jury trial on whether he was eligible for
the death penalty as a result of psychological testing. The second habeas
proceeding dragged on until 2002, during which time the defendant and
the State argued over several issues including turning over any and all
evidence. In November 2002, an evidentiary hearing was held at which
time the State produced a document from GBI stating the neckties and
bathrobe belt had been destroyed in 1979. The hearing on defendant’s
intellectual disability was held in 2003 which resulted in a mistrial, after
which the defendant and the State agreed to resentence the defendant to
life without parole. 88
In 2015, defendant again contacted his original attorneys and asked
to look into the State’s files for documentation of the physical evidence
from the 1977 crime scene and documentation of the destroyed evidence.
Id.
308 Ga. 238, 840 S.E.2d 437 (2020).
83 Id. at 239, 840 S.E2d at 439–40.
84 Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85 Gates, 308 Ga. at 242, 840 S.E.2d at 442.
86 Id. at 242–43, 840 S.E.2d at 442.
87 Id. at 243, 840 S.E.2d at 442.
88 Id. at 243–46, 840 S.E.2d at 442–45.
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Later that year, interns from defendant’s attorneys went to the District
Attorney’s office in Columbus and actually located the missing neckties
and bathrobe belt in a manila envelope. An extraordinary motion for
DNA testing was ordered and the GBI found three different DNA profiles
on the evidence but could not test further due to testing policies in place
at the time at the GBI. 89
Defendant sought further testing by a defense DNA expert and on
February 1, 2017, the trial court ordered further testing of the DNA
found on the belt and tie by the GBI and comparison of the results of that
testing with a DNA reference sample taken from Gates.
The trial court also permitted Gates to analyze the results and
comparison through probabilistic genotyping software known as
TrueAllele. That analysis was conducted by a company known as
Cybergenetics. The GBI's initial analysis of the DNA samples was
inconclusive, but the TrueAllele analysis excluded Gates as a
contributor to the DNA mixture found on the belt and tie. 90

Based on this new evidence, a new trial was ordered for the defendant in
2017 and the State appealed, arguing the trial court had not followed the
standard for ordering a new trial on newly discovered evidence 91 under
Timberlake v. State 92 which states:
It is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court: (1) that the evidence
has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to
the want of due diligence that he did not acquire it sooner; (3) that it
is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict; (4)
that it is not cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness
himself should be procured or its absence accounted for; and (6) that a
new trial will not be granted if the only effect of the evidence will be to
impeach the credit of a witness. 93

The supreme court disagreed and ruled that, although the State’s
evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong, the State was incorrect in
arguing that the defendant had known about the evidence since 1977 and
in fact had been led to believe since 2002 that it had been destroyed and
was not aware of the existence of the evidence until the rediscovery of

Id. at 247, 840 S.E.2d at 445.
Id. at 248, 840 S.E.2d at 445–46.
91 Id. at 250, 840 S.E.2d at 447.
92 246 Ga. 488, 271 S.E.2d 792 (1980).
93 Id. at 491, 271 S.E.2d at 795–96.
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said evidence in 2015. 94 Further, the court held that science of “Touch
DNA” and TrueAllele technology was not in existence in 1977, and the
results of these tests and the accompanying testimony are in fact
material and exculpatory to the defendant. 95 As such, defendant was
granted a new trial. 96
IV. CONCLUSION
These decisions are just a handful of the cases that will impact criminal
law in Georgia. The law is always in a state of flux, which requires
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys alike to always be aware of
the cases granted certiorari by the courts and be aware of the impact
their decisions will have on the cases argued across this state and country
for years to come. In an era of Covid-19, with the courts turning to
technology to streamline cases and the inevitable issues that will arise
as a result, I expect more decisions and laws to affect a defendant’s right
to confrontation and the way evidence is admitted in courts across the
United States and specifically Georgia.

Gates, 308 Ga. at 254, 840 S.E.2d at 450.
Id. at 254, 259–60, 840 S.E.2d at 450, 453.
96 Id. at 265, 840 S.E.2d at 456.
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